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INTRODUCTION
This Article is written in celebration of the sixtieth anniversary 
of Brown v. Board of Education and the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Article honors the 2014 conference 
created by the University of Missouri–Kansas City School of Law 
and the Michigan State University College of Law—Pursuing the 
Dreams of Brown and the Civil Rights Act: A Living History of the 
Fight for Educational Equality. Given the structure of that 
conference, I intend for this to be digestible by legal researchers, 
educational researchers, practitioners, and those interested in 
grassroots advocacy fighting for equity, equality, and justice. My 
goal is to consider the United States Supreme Court’s intent 
conveyed through the Brown decision in light of the Court’s recent 
decisions as well as observed social implications.
[R]ace matters for reasons that really are only skin deep, that cannot be 
discussed any other way, and that cannot be wished away. Race matters to 
a young man’s view of society when he spends his teenage years watching 
others tense up as he passes, no matter the neighborhood where he grew 
up. Race matters to a young woman’s sense of self when she states her 
hometown, and then is pressed, “No, where are you really from?”, [sic] 
regardless of how many generations her family has been in the country. 
Race matters to a young person addressed by a stranger in a foreign 
language, which he does not understand because only English was spoken 
at home. Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the silent 
judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: “I do not belong 
here.”1
I knew what a law degree from Yale was worth when it bore the taint of 
racial preference. . . . I peeled a fifteen-cent price sticker off a package of 
cigars and stuck it on the frame of my law degree to remind myself of the 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. I 
am extremely grateful for the support of my colleagues at the University of 
Wyoming, especially the faculty and staff at the George W. Hopper Law Library. 
This Article benefited greatly from a presentation at the 2014 John Mercer Langston 
Black Male Faculty Writing Workshop, generally, and Professor Areto 
Imoukhuede’s advice, more specifically. Also, much thanks to my mentor, Professor 
Kevin Brown, for his continued guidance. Exceptional research assistance was 
provided by Nicholas Bjorklund, primarily, and Alan Walker Steinhage, 
secondarily. Perhaps most importantly, this research could not have been completed 
without economic support from the University of Wyoming College of Law Tuition 
Differential Funds. Thank you!
1. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & 
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 
1676 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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mistake I’d made by going to Yale. I never did change my mind about its 
value.2
The above statements evidence that two United States Supreme 
Court Justices “of color,” Justice Sotomayor and Justice Thomas, 
respectively, the country’s appointed leading legal minds, have very 
different conclusions about “race” realities. This suggests that the 
word race conjures a variety of meanings to different individuals. It 
is a “closed door” word—something that people are not supposed to 
talk about unless absolutely necessary. Integration—closely aligned 
with the word race—is another word that often elicits very different 
responses from different people. Placed together—racial 
integration—one of the most divisive topics in our society is 
created.3 Some, both black and white,4 see full implementation of 
racial integration as a salve for most, if not all, of the ills that plague 
the nation, including issues of education.5 Others, both black and 
white, see accepting the many racial, ethnic, or cultural differences 
as the most efficient means of achieving maximal gains6 for all 
involved.7
2. CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 87, 99-100 
(2007). Justice Thomas further states that “a law degree from Yale meant one thing 
for white graduates and another for blacks, no matter how much anyone denied it; I 
couldn’t do anything about that now.” Id. at 99. Justice Thomas attributes this to the 
effects of affirmative action on the minds of potential employers. Id. at 86.
3. See generally ERICA FRANKENBERG, GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & JIA 
WANG, CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS (2010), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choice-without-equity-2009-
report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf (discussing the impact of 
charter schools on racial integration); see also Does It Matter if Schools Are Racially 
Integrated?, NPR (May 16, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.npr.org/
2014/05/16/313063913/does-it-matter-if-schools-are-racially-integrated (discussing 
the importance of racial integration strategies).
4. Because of their popular and common use in mainstream media, I will 
use the terms black and white interchangeably with African-American and 
European-American, respectively. When considering others’ research, I will try to 
stay true to the original word choice.
5. See NAT’L ACAD. OF EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING 
STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES
2 (Robert L. Linn & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2007) [hereinafter Linn & Welner], 
available at http://www.naeducation.org/cs/groups/naedsite/documents/webpage/
naed_080863.pdf (discussing four positive effects of racial integration).
6. Gains may be measured in standardized achievement scores, college 
enrollment, employability, etc. Id. at 19.
7. See W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?,
4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335 (1935) (arguing that the “Negro needs neither segregated 
schools nor mixed schools . . . [but] [e]ducation”).
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This Article briefly addresses some American techniques for 
“handling” racial integration within elementary and secondary school 
systems and, particularly, considers the United States Supreme 
Court’s intent conveyed through the Brown decision in light of the 
Court’s recent decisions as well as observed social implications. The 
outcomes, whether good or bad, will affect the racial attitude of this 
country for this and future generations. Because racial hatred, and all 
of its related emotions, is both taught and innate,8 this Article argues 
that a multi-leveled anti-racism campaign should be embraced.
This Article begins by very briefly reviewing the most famous 
racial integration case, Brown v. Board of Education,9 taking a look 
at its intent and its implementation. Bringing Brown into the present, 
the Article then analyzes current attempts by public educational 
institutions to comport with the Brown mandate. Two relatively 
recent attempts came from Louisville, Kentucky and Seattle, 
Washington.10 Another challenged an amendment to a state 
constitution.11 The Article will review the U.S. Supreme Court cases 
that came from those attempts. In addressing the actual cases, this 
Article assumes that racial integration is a preferred societal good12
and will, therefore, assess the strategies used to promote racial 
integration. To determine the most legally effective methods of 
achieving racial integration, the Article evaluates the Court’s 
decisions, both critiquing the Court’s analysis and seeking the 
8. DEBRA VAN AUSDALE & JOE R. FEAGIN, THE FIRST R: HOW CHILDREN 
LEARN RACE AND RACISM 178-79, 194-96 (2001).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. These cases were consolidated once they reached the United States 
Supreme Court. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 
F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006); McFarland v. 
Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom.
Meredith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178 (2006). The Supreme Court 
opinion may be found at Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
11. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & 
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 
1629 (2014).
12. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 1-3
(2010); see also Brian L. Goff, Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Racial 
Integration as an Innovation: Empirical Evidence from Sports Leagues, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 16, 16 (2002) (“[R]acial integration [is] an innovation in economic 
process[, and] [l]ike other innovations, at some point in time firm [sic] and 
individuals find it advantageous to incorporate additional and potentially more 
productive inputs previously unavailable due to law, custom, or managerial 
discretion.”).
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Court’s direction on how to implement similar plans that will pass 
review. Finally, the Article suggests strategies for modern day 
implementation of the Brown mandate.
What started in Kansas, the midwestern United States, has 
engulfed our country.13 From the east (Louisville, Kentucky) to the 
west (Seattle, Washington), numerous localities are still attempting 
to comply with the Supreme Court’s order in Brown, sixty years after 
the decision. Simultaneously, others are determined to return to 
Plessy.14 As the states search for direction, the very Court that 
created a movement confounds and confuses those that attempt to 
comply. This Article will, hopefully, act as a compass for those 
attempting to comport with Brown.
I. BROWN I—BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
Unarguably, the most famous racial-integration case in the 
history of the United States, Brown forever changed the face of 
American education, both literally and figuratively, and essentially 
created a new fundamental right.15 Brown brought children of all 
colors, races, and ethnicities into the same classroom at the same 
time.16 While many modern classrooms are as homogenous as they 
were prior to Brown,17 much of the cause must be associated with 
economic disparities and other forms of discrimination.18
13. Brown came out of Topeka, Kansas. A quick search of cases citing to 
Brown discloses that all fifty states have cited it in their state courts, and all but three 
(Alaska, Idaho, and South Dakota) have cited it in the federal courts in their states.
14. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Voters in some places have shown distrust for 
integration efforts and have introduced measures to combat those efforts, arguably a 
step back toward Plessy. See, e.g., Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629 (discussing an 
amendment to a state constitution prohibiting affirmative action in a wide range of 
governmental actions in the state); see also infra notes 17 and 150 (discussing the 
recent trends toward resegregation in America’s schools).
15. Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to 
Provide Public Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 81 (2011) (discussing 
the libertarian perspective as privileging the liberty of the historical majority over 
the duty to provide an equal educational opportunity to all of the nation’s children).
16. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.”).
17. See Linn & Welner, supra note 5, at 10. This research shows that black 
and Latino students attended “hyper-segregated schools” in greater numbers in 2001 
than in 1991 in almost every region of the country. Id. Moreover, despite general 
desegregation among black students (except in the Northeast) nationwide since 
1968, Latino students were significantly more segregated in 2001 than in 1968, 
except in the Northeast. Id.; see also FRANKENBERG, SIEGEL-HAWLEY & WANG,
652 Michigan State Law Review 2014:647
In Brown, the NAACP and other civil rights organizations 
challenged the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plessy and the attitude of 
many American citizens.19 On behalf of five school districts across 
the nation, a suit was filed in the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that 
black children were receiving an inferior education to white children, 
and that separate schools could never be equal schools.20 While some 
argue that Brown was an indication of the benevolence of the Court 
and the American people,21 others contend that the plaintiffs 
strategically litigated prior cases in a way that “cornered” the
Court.22 For others, this combined with pressure exerted by foreign 
countries upon America to reform is what led to the Brown
decision.23
The Court overruled Plessy24 and reached several significant 
conclusions. Although the United States Constitution implies that 
education is left to state control,25 the Court wrote that “where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, [education] is a right which must 
be made available to all on equal terms.”26 The Court went on to add 
that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”27
supra note 3, at 7 (noting that charter schools are more likely than traditional 
schools to produce racially isolated schools).
18. Cedric Merlin Powell, Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and the Failure 
of the Colorblind Equal Protection Clause, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 362, 410-
11 (2008) (discussing the nature of white flight and residential segregation as a 
direct result of intentional segregation).
19. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 488; see also THOMAS, supra note 2, at 14 
(discussing attitudes toward integration in Georgia following the Court’s decision in 
Brown).
20. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1, 488.
21. Cf. Gloria Ladson-Billings, Landing on the Wrong Note: The Price We 
Paid for Brown, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Oct. 2004, at 3, 3 (discussing the reasons that 
“the Brown decision is not the result of America as a good and altruistic nation”).
22. Id. at 4 (“[T]he case came at a time when the Court had almost no other 
choice but to rule in favor of the plaintiffs.”).
23. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (“[T]he decision helped 
to provide immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to 
win the hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples.”); Mary L. Dudziak, 
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62 (1988) 
(“Although seemingly at odds with the restrictive approach to individual rights in 
other contexts, the U.S. government’s participation in the desegregation cases during 
the McCarthy era was no anomaly.” (footnote omitted)).
24. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-10.
26. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
27. Id. at 495.
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Essentially, with those two thoughts, the de jure institution of 
separate schooling was demolished; or so we believed.
II. BROWN II—THE TRANSITION: “WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED”
School districts, many of which had known nothing other than 
segregated schooling,28 were under court order to end a tradition.29
The Court was fearful of how the states would react to its ruling.30 In 
an attempt to accommodate those defeated in this litigation, the 
Court proposed a timetable that proved to be less than helpful to all 
involved.31 The Court ordered that the first Brown decision was to be 
implemented and schools were to be desegregated “with all 
deliberate speed.”32
A timetable would show that, with the signing of the 
Declaration of Independence in 1776, the United States of America 
was born.33 That makes America 238 years old. For nearly one-fourth 
of the life of this country, American primary and secondary 
education has either been attempting, failing, or ignoring compliance 
with the Brown mandate.34 If the Court ordered compliance “with all 
deliberate speed” and such compliance has yet to be reached in 
approximately sixty years,35 it would appear that either the 1954 
Court meant, or the modern day Court has modified, “with all 
deliberate speed” to be something akin to “cautious coasting.”36
28. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1955).
29. Id. at 298.
30. See id. at 298-99 (recognizing the nationwide importance of the 
decision, and its potential impact on the communities involved); see also Ladson-
Billings, supra note 21, at 5 (discussing the impact of “[w]hite fear” on the 
implementation of Brown).
31. Ladson-Billings, supra note 21, at 6-7 (discussing continuing 
segregation following the Brown decisions and its effects).
32. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
33. Although many travelers reached American shores far before this date, 
there was no definitive statement until 1776 of what the “new land” would become 
or be called. The Declaration of Independence established the name of the emerging 
nation. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (“The unanimous 
Declaration of the thirteen united States of America.”).
34. See Ladson-Billings, supra note 21, at 6; Linn & Welner, supra note 5,
at 10.
35. “If we consider Brown as a ruling designed to eliminate school 
segregation, we know that, for the most part, it has been a failure.” Ladson-Billings, 
supra note 21, at 6.
36. Powell, supra note 18, at 398 (discussing the limitations of the “all 
deliberate speed” language from Brown II in the context of Swann v. Charlotte–
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
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III. CURRENT DESEGREGATION EFFORTS—LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 
AND SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Recently, school districts within the cities of Louisville, 
Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington attempted actions meant to better 
integrate their schools.37 In Parents Involved in Community Schools 
(PICS), both school districts won before the United States district 
court for their respective districts.38 In fact, while the Louisville case 
was decided by trial,39 the Seattle case was so overwhelmingly strong 
that the matter was decided on summary judgment.40 When appealed 
to the United States court of appeals for their respective circuits, both 
decisions were affirmed.41 In fact, the Seattle matter was decided en 
banc.42 The en banc hearing is a fairly rare bird, where all of the 
judges who hear cases in that circuit take part in the decision.43 For 
obvious reasons, an en banc decision carries greater “prestige.”44 Yet, 
given these backgrounds, the 2006 Supreme Court elected to hear 
these cases.
The Seattle matter used a student assignment plan that relied on 
racial classification to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools.45
An entering high school student (at the ninth grade level) was 
allowed to rank his or her choice of high schools.46 As usual, certain 
“Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and 
Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 680 
(discussing the pervasiveness of discrimination in society, including in the legal 
system).
37. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 
1162, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); McFarland v. Jefferson 
Cnty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d mem., 416 F.3d 
513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
38. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 850; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2001), aff’d en 
banc, 426 F.3d 1162, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
39. See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
40. See Parents Involved, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
41. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1193; McFarland, 416 F.3d at 514.
42. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1172.
43. See Mario Lucero, Note, The Second Circuit’s En Banc Crisis, 2013
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 32, 33.
44. See Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the “Mini-
Supreme Court,” 13 J.L. & POL. 377, 387-88 (1997) (discussing the benefits of en 
banc review, including that the “en banc decision[] epitomize[s] a court’s collective 
judgment and enhances its judicial legitimacy in reaching a final outcome”).
45. Parents Involved, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
46. Id.
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schools were more popular than others.47 When there were more 
students interested in attending a given school than there were slots 
available, the school district implemented a tiebreaker.48 Here, the 
tiebreaker involved three issues: siblings, race, and proximity to 
residence.49 If an applicant already had a sibling in the school of 
choice, the applicant was given preference.50 Next, the race of the 
applicant was taken into consideration.51 The school district’s total 
enrollment consisted of approximately 41% white students and 59% 
non-white students.52 “If an oversubscribed school [was] not within 
10 percentage points of the district’s overall white/nonwhite racial 
balance, it . . . [was labeled] ‘integration positive.’”53 Once identified 
as “integration positive,” the tiebreaker selected students who would 
bring the racial composition of the school back into range (41% 
white/59% non-white ± 10%).54 Lastly, the tiebreaker considered the 
proximity of the school of choice to the student’s residence.55
The Louisville matter involved elementary schools grouped 
into clusters to promote integration.56 Upon entry into kindergarten 
or first grade or transfer from an outside district, the parents of a 
student were allowed to pick the student’s first and second choices
within their respective cluster.57 Placement at the school of choice 
was guided by space availability and a racial guideline.58 Here, the 
school district’s total enrollment was comprised of approximately 
97,000 students who were approximately 66% white students and 
34% black students.59 Given these demographics, the school district 
sought to keep all non-magnet schools within a range of no less than 
15% and no more than 50% black enrollment.60
The school districts implemented these particular plans 
intending to accomplish certain goals. In particular, they wanted to 
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 
U.S. 701, 711-12 (2007).
50. See id.
51. Id. at 712.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
426 F.3d 1162, 1213 (2005), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 716.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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advance the educational benefits of racially diverse schools,61 and 
they wanted to avoid the harms of racial isolation.62 Of the 
educational benefits of racially diverse schools, the school districts
particularly wanted to improve critical-thinking skills,63 improve race 
relations,64 improve African-American student achievement,65 better 
prepare their students “for a diverse workplace and citizenship,”66
and create “‘one community of roughly equal schools.’”67 The harms 
of racial isolation that the school districts wanted to avoid included 
lower student performance, disparities in teacher quality, and 
disparities in advanced courses. 68
A. Louisville and Seattle Goals
Given the direct and important connection to the Brown
mandate, we might take a closer look at the cities of Louisville and 
Seattle, where the school districts articulated certain goals. Though 
not as broad as the arguments made throughout this Article, 
Louisville and Seattle had rationally thought about why they were 
pursuing the Brown mandate. These goals were briefly discussed 
above. The National Academy of Education (NAE) further analyzed 
the social science research that was associated with these goals.69
They found five key questions that were addressed by that research:
61. Brief for Respondents at 19, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 26 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 162 (Wash. 2003)); ARTHUR L. COLEMAN, SCOTT R. PALMER &
STEVEN Y. WINNICK, ECHOES OF BAKKE: A FRACTURED SUPREME COURT 
INVALIDATES TWO RACE-CONSCIOUS K-12 STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS BUT 
AFFIRMS THE COMPELLING INTEREST IN THE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY
(2007), available at
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/diversitycollaborative/EchoesofBakk
e.pdf.
64. Brief for Respondents, supra note 61, at 26 (“By attending a racially 
and ethnically diverse high school, students have the opportunity to learn through 
experience that a person’s race or ethnicity does not equate with any particular 
character trait or viewpoint.”); COLEMAN, PALMER & WINNICK, supra note 63.
65. Brief for Respondents, supra note 61, at 27-28; COLEMAN, PALMER &
WINNICK, supra note 63.
66. COLEMAN, PALMER & WINNICK, supra note 63; Brief for Respondents, 
supra note 61, at 28.
67. COLEMAN, PALMER & WINNICK, supra note 63; Brief for Respondents, 
supra note 61, at 27.
68. See COLEMAN, PALMER & WINNICK, supra note 63.
69. See Linn & Welner, supra note 5, at 1.
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1. Is racial diversity in a school environment associated with improved 
academic achievement?
2. Is racial diversity in a school environment associated with improved 
intergroup relations?
3. Is racial diversity in a school environment associated with improved 
long-term effects?
4. Is there a “critical mass” (or some counterpart) of racial diversity 
associated with any benefits of racial diversity?
5. Are there race-neutral alternatives that can yield benefits that are 
comparable to benefits that we know to be associated with race-
conscious policies?70
This Article will discuss these research questions and 
summarize the findings below. However, it is important to contrast 
the methods of analysis done by this team of researchers with that 
done by the Supreme Court. In arriving at its conclusions, the 
committee of seven,71 appointed by the NAE, reviewed 
approximately sixty-four “amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs 
filed with the Supreme Court in support of petitioners and 
respondents in these two cases.”72 Its analysis, in brief, concluded 
that while levels of outcome will vary, planned school integration 
causes an increase in minority achievement while having no effect 
on majority achievement.73 This conclusion should be contrasted 
with that of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas whose analysis 
concluded that attempts to racially integrate schools were an “elitist 
fad.”74 Disregarding the elitist label, Webster’s Dictionary defines a 
“fad” as “a practice or interest followed for a time with exaggerated 
70. Id. at 6.
71. Noted in contrast to the nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
72. Linn & Welner, supra note 5, at 5.
73. Id. at 20.
74. James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121
HARV. L. REV. 131, 131 (2007) (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 780-81 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)); see also
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“There is 
disagreement about whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal 
protection in approving [a] compelling interest in diversity.”); id. at 2424 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he educational benefits flowing from student body diversity—
assuming they exist—hardly qualify as a compelling state interest.”); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“The majority upholds the Law School’s racial discrimination not by 
interpreting the people’s Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the 
cognoscenti.”).
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zeal.”75 Since the Brown decision in 1954, there has been continual 
recognition of the need to integrate schools.76 The Supreme Court 
supported that need when it stated that segregation “‘has a tendency 
to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro 
children.’”77 The Coleman Report reinforced this fact in 1966 when 
it found that the achievement scores of black students will rise when 
the students are placed in an integrated school environment (with no 
adverse effect upon the white students).78 And today, we see the
plans of Seattle and Louisville continuing to address this issue.79 Any 
activity spanning half of a century would be hard pressed to be 
labeled a fad.
Now, the Article will more fully consider the five key 
questions addressed by the NAE’s research.
1. Is Racial Diversity in a School Environment Associated with 
Improved Academic Achievement?
The NAE committee reviewed the studies used by both 
petitioners (those opposed to the Seattle and Louisville plans) and 
respondents.80 The committee charted the time periods that each side 
relied upon in their studies.81 The petitioners relied upon ten studies 
while the respondents relied upon fifty-nine.82 Moreover, half of the 
studies used only by the petitioners were conducted prior to the 
1980s.83 Nearly all of the respondents’ studies were conducted in the 
1990s or 2000s.84 The importance of dating the studies can be found 
75. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 416 (10th ed. 2000).
76. See, e.g., PICS, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (describing racial integration as one of “our highest 
aspirations”); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(recognizing that state-enforced segregation is a harm).
77. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (alteration in original) 
(quoting a finding from the Kansas district court case); Linn & Welner, supra note 
5, at 13.
78. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY 28-29 (1966).
79. See supra Part III.A (discussing the goals of the school districts in the 
PICS case).
80. See Linn & Welner, supra note 5, at 5-6 (discussing the methodology of 
the study).
81. Id. at 13 tbl.3 (summarizing the amicus curiae briefs submitted in PICS
by decade).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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in the statistical tools available.85 In part because of the increased 
sophistication of computers from the 1960s to the present, many 
higher levels of analysis were simply not attainable in older studies.86
While the committee specifically refrained from drawing causal 
connections, it concluded that racial diversity in a school 
environment does not negatively impinge upon non-minority 
students and positively benefits minority students, especially in the 
earlier grades.87
2. Is Racial Diversity in a School Environment Associated with 
Improved Intergroup Relations?
Repeating the breadth of analysis found in the first issue, “the 
briefs opposing race-conscious policies cite an average of roughly 
five studies,” while “the briefs supporting race-conscious policies 
cite an average of more than 13 studies related to this issue (with one 
citing almost 50).”88 After reviewing all studies cited in briefs that 
argued intergroup relations, the committee found that “[i]n sum, 
racially diverse schools and classrooms will not guarantee improved 
intergroup relations. However, current research supports the 
conclusion that, generally speaking, such diverse environments are 
likely to be constructive in this regard.”89
3. Is Racial Diversity in a School Environment Associated with 
Improved Long-Term Effects?
While the NAE recognized that results in this area are difficult 
to define, it once again distinguished the briefs opposing race-
conscious policies as generally failing to address long-term effects.90
On the other hand, “[a] half-dozen of the amicus briefs supporting 
race-conscious student assignment policies include[d] substantial 
85. See id. at 15 & n.14 (noting that the early studies often did not have 
individual student data available to them and that many studies use free and 
reduced-price lunch as a proxy for socioeconomic status because household income 
is not available to them).
86. See generally A. Baines, Statistics and Computers, 12 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC’Y, SERIES D (THE STATISTICIAN) 32 (1962) (discussing the effects of the advent 
of the electronic computer on statistical work and the role of the statistician).
87. Linn & Welner, supra note 5, at 20.
88. Id. at 22.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Id. at 30.
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discussions of the long-term effects of desegregated schools.”91 The 
committee concluded that “[t]he weight of the research evidence 
supports the conclusion that there are long-term benefits of 
desegregation in elementary and secondary schools. Under some 
circumstances and over the long term, experience in desegregated 
schools increases the likelihood of greater tolerance and better 
intergroup relations among adults of different racial groups.”92
4. Is There a “Critical Mass” (or Some Counterpart) of Racial 
Diversity Associated with Any Benefits in Racial Diversity?
Critical mass essentially means having enough of a given race 
to ensure that the members of that race are not left in isolation or 
perceived as being the voice of that race.93 The “critical” aspect of 
this analysis suggests use of critical race theory (CRT). An element 
of CRT is storytelling.94 Here, it seems appropriate to engage 
storytelling to highlight the need for “critical mass.”
Imagine being the only African-American graduate student 
sitting in a room with fifty other students when the topic of 
subsidized housing arises. Proportionally, the majority of recipients 
of subsidized housing are African-American.95 As the discussion 
turns on the societal costs of supporting such housing,96 many of the 
majority (read: European-American) students, who are mostly from 
middle- to upper-class backgrounds, begin to question why the 
economic advantages they earned as a birthright should be decreased 
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2.
93. See id. at 33.
94. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 10 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the “legal storytelling” movement).
95. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 120 tbl.C-17-RO 
(2013). This study shows that, among 38,816 renter-occupied units, 5,283 were 
owned by a public housing authority or were paid by some government subsidy. Id.
Of those 5,283 units, 2,044 were occupied by “Black[s] alone.” Id. This was more 
than twice the number occupied by “Hispanic[s]” (984). Id. Finally, it should be 
noted that 25% of black households in the study were subsidized, compared to 13% 
of all households sampled. Id.
96. See, e.g., Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Does Federally Subsidized Rental 
Housing Depress Neighborhood Property Values?, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
257, 278-79 (2007) (finding, inter alia, that subsidized housing for low-income 
families has a more negative impact on the surrounding community than housing for 
the elderly, and that Section 8 housing had a significant negative impact on the 
community).
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in order to support a group that “cannot support themselves.” The 
focus then turns to the single African-American student to justify 
why white people should support black people.97 Regardless of 
whether the African-American student ever resided in subsidized 
housing, the moment can only go from bad to worse. To argue in 
support of subsidized housing only reinforces the idea that “of course 
you’d support your people.” To argue against subsidized housing 
will likely lead to a labeling of “you’re not like the rest of them.” 
Neither result is desirable, especially in an educational setting.
To challenge the European-American perspective, one might 
suggest this exercise: As a European-American, travel to an African 
country such as Zimbabwe, Rwanda, or the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Plan to stay for at least ten years. While there, in each and 
every group setting, argue in support of the “white perspective.” In 
reality, most will never undertake such an endeavor. There will be 
many reasons to justify the lack of any attempt, but the bottom line 
is, even if financially plausible and lacking any time constraints, 
most would decline because that situation would be overwhelmingly 
uncomfortable. Yet that is the exact situation most “educated” 
African Americans find themselves in . . . each and every day of 
their lives.
The NAE committee found that this was yet another area that
was difficult to define. In large part, the briefs on both sides of the 
matter avoided discussing this topic.98 Even within its own analysis, 
the committee was unable to pinpoint the moment in which “critical 
mass” occurs.99 However, research indicates “to avoid the harms 
associated with racial isolation,” minority percentages should be no 
less than 15% to 30%.100
5. Are There Race-Neutral Alternatives That Can Yield 
Benefits That Are Comparable to Benefits That We Know to 
Be Associated with Race-Conscious Policies?
Race-neutral alternatives are clearly the choice of today’s 
Supreme Court and likely the preference of all involved. Current 
97. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (acknowledging, by 
negating it, that minority students are often viewed as expressing a “‘characteristic 
minority viewpoint on any issue’” (quoting Brief for Respondents at 30, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)).
98. Linn & Welner, supra note 5, at 33.
99. Id. at 34-35.
100. Id. at 35; these figures are intended as guides, not absolutes.
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race-neutral suggestions involve income-focused criteria,101 magnet 
schools,102 and lottery-style selection.103 However, implementation 
without effective outcomes is a waste of time, energy, and resources. 
The NAE committee found “that school choice generally, and 
magnet schools in particular, do have some potential to reduce racial 
isolation. However, that potential is only likely to be realized to any 
significant degree if enrollment constraints (race-neutral or race-
conscious . . .) are part of the school choice policy.”104 Moreover, 
“although assignments made on the basis of socioeconomic status are 
likely to marginally reduce racial isolation and may have other 
benefits—none of the proposed alternatives is as effective as race-
conscious policies for achieving racial diversity.”105
Thus, the research exists to support the goals of Seattle and 
Louisville.106 Each city should feel confident that what it does is done 
in the best interests of the children.107 Now, the emphasis must turn 
to annihilating all legal obstacles.
B. United States Supreme Court Review
The Supreme Court reviewed the Louisville and Seattle cases 
using its highest level of review: strict scrutiny.108 This level is 
reserved for reviewing governmental actions involving race or 
national origin.109 This is distinguished from intermediate scrutiny, 
which is used for issues such as gender and sexual orientation,110 and 
101. Id. at 40-41.
102. Id. at 39.
103. Id. at 41.
104. Id. at 40.
105. Id. at 42.
106. Id. at 45.
107. See id. at 43-45 (discussing the benefits of integration).
108. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 
U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
109. See id.; City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
440 (1985). 
110. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996) (explaining why 
an intermediate level of scrutiny would be used for classifications based on sex); 
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Between these extremes of rational basis 
review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has 
been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”); 
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013) (concluding that homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class and that 
classifications based on such a status are subject to intermediate scrutiny); see also
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion 
for application of an intermediate level of scrutiny to sex-based classifications).
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rational basis review, the weakest review level.111 Under strict 
scrutiny, a plan must be “‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a 
‘compelling’ government interest.”112 In the arena of schooling, the 
Court has currently recognized two areas that will meet strict 
scrutiny. One relies on remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination.113 The other is founded on an interest in increasing 
diversity within higher education.114
“At issue was the constitutionality of desegregation policies 
voluntarily adopted by the Jefferson County School District (in 
Louisville, Kentucky) and the Seattle School District asking whether 
these race-based student assignment policies violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.”115 Using strict scrutiny, the Court found, in a fractured 
four-one-four116 opinion, that
the racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly 
tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits 
asserted to flow from racial diversity. In design and operation, the plans 
are directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court 
has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.117
In so finding, the Court temporarily halted efforts by the school 
districts to comply with Brown’s mandate.118
111. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (“At a minimum, a statutory classification must 
be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”).
112. PICS, 551 U.S. at 720.
113. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). Ironically, the 
Louisville school district had previously been under court order to remedy the past 
effects of discrimination within their district. In 2000, the court lifted the order 
stating that the school district had done all that it could do to desegregate its 
population. Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 382 
(W.D. Ky. 2000). One could argue that the school district disagreed with the court’s 
analysis because it continued to pursue actions that would create better racial 
balance within its schools. Yet, rarely does any institution desire to be under court 
order. The continual oversight by an institution not equipped to efficiently manage 
education and the stigma attached are but two reasons for avoidance.
114. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. 
Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).
115. Linn & Welner, supra note 5, at 5 (footnote omitted).
116. 4—Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justices Alito, Scalia, and 
Thomas in the concurring opinion; 1—Justice Kennedy concurred in part and 
concurred in the judgment; and 4—Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Ginsberg,
Souter, and Stevens in dissent. PICS, 551 U.S. at 701.
117. Id. at 726.
118. For a more thorough analysis of PICS that fully critiques the Supreme 
Court’s utilization of a post-racial constitutionalism grounded in liberal 
individualism and considers Justice Thomas’s analysis of race, see generally Cedric 
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An updated Seattle school-assignment plan uses a system of 
attendance area, option, and service schools.119 The attendance areas 
from which the students are chosen are drawn with nine factors in 
mind: proximity of students to schools, walk zones established by the 
City, efficiency of bus routing for elementary and middle schools, 
metro-transit options for high schools, demographics, opportunities 
for creating diversity within boundaries, physical barriers like water, 
balanced target enrollment for middle schools, and availability of 
“Open Choice” seats.120 Students may apply to attend a different 
attendance area school than the one to which they are assigned.121 If
an attendance area school is over-subscribed, then a set of tiebreakers 
is used to determine who is admitted.122 The tiebreakers differ for 
elementary, middle, and high schools.123 The first tiebreaker at all 
schools is the sibling tiebreaker, which means that if an applicant has 
a sibling who attends the school and will attend the following year, 
then that student gets priority.124 At the middle school level, there is a 
feeder school tiebreaker.125 This tiebreaker is unclear, but it seems to 
give priority to students who are trying to attend a middle school that 
is in their feeder school program.126 The only way this tiebreaker is 
likely to be used is in the situation where a student was going to be 
assigned to their desired school, but it doesn’t offer the services they 
need (accelerated, bilingual, special needs, etc.).127 Finally, there is a 
lottery tiebreaker at all levels.128 The lottery tiebreaker works by 
randomly assigning a rank to each student using a computer.129
Merlin Powell, Justice Thomas, Brown, and Post-Racial Determinism, 53 
WASHBURN L.J. 451 (2014).
119. SEATTLE PUB. SCH., STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLAN 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.seattleschools.org/modules/groups/homepagefiles/cms/1583136/File/De
partmental%20Content/enrollment%20planning/New%20Student%20Assignment%
20Plan.pdf.
120. Id. at 10-11. The italicized factors, used in determining the boundaries 
for attendance areas, indicate that the district is still considering race in allocating 
students, but it is doing so in accord with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. PICS, 551 
U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
121. SEATTLE PUB. SCH., supra note 119, at 8.
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 14.
127. See id. at 7.
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id. at 14.
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To their credit, the school districts have attempted to follow the 
suggestions implied by Justice Kennedy’s opinion. As interpreted by 
Linn & Welner, Justice Kennedy suggests that “race-conscious 
considerations can be used for making such non-individualized 
decisions as school site selection, drawing attendance zones, and 
targeted recruitment of students and faculty.”130 While the new 
approach may seem more in line with the direction articulated by the 
Court, this strategy will likely still fall short of the mandate of 
today’s Supreme Court.131 Already, the plaintiffs in the prior 
litigation have indicated a desire to bring the proposed plan before 
the prior trial judge.132 If Louisville (as well as Seattle and other 
school districts) wants to overcome the challenges already identified, 
the district must re-think its goals, the design of the plan, and its 
strategies, as the district heads toward litigation.
130. Linn & Welner, supra note 5, at 9. Race-conscious student assignment 
policies (RCSAPs) are often the most effective means for obtaining the benefits of 
racial integration. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
426 F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[H]igh schools in Seattle would be highly 
segregated absent race conscious measures.”), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Kevin 
Brown, The Constitutionality of Racial Classifications in Public School Admissions,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 79-80 (2000) (concluding from the then-current direction of 
federal jurisprudence that, “[i]n terms of strict scrutiny, public schools have a 
compelling state interest in inculcating the values derived from the Equal Protection 
Clause, and using racial classifications in an effort to promote voluntary integration 
may be narrowly tailored to advance such an interest”); Michael J. Kaufman, PICS
in Focus: A Majority of the Supreme Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Race-
Conscious School Integration Strategies, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 11-16 (2007) 
(discussing PICS and the view of a majority of the Court that RCSAPs generally 
serve a compelling government interest and can be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest); Kevin G. Welner, K-12 Race-Conscious Student Assignment Policies: 
Law, Social Science, and Diversity, 76 REV. EDUC. RES. 349, 377 (2006) 
(concluding, after discussing the social science research showing the benefits of 
racial integration, that “[f]or policymakers willing to acknowledge and confront 
[the] reality [of a society in which race still matters], RCSAPs might be an important 
policy option for the near future”). But see Kathryn A. McDermott, Diversity or 
Desegregation? Implications of Arguments for Diversity in K-12 and Higher 
Education, 15 EDUC. POL’Y 452, 471 (2001) (warning against replacing integration 
with diversity and thereby achieving less than optimal results in educational 
opportunity for inner-city minority children).
131. See Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Income, Race, Education 
Criteria for Assignments, COURIER-J., Jan. 29, 2008, at A1 (“‘On the surface, 
without seeing a detailed review of the JCPS proposed plan, this new student 
assignment seems to be unconstitutional.’” (quoting “Teddy Gordon, the lawyer who 
fought to throw out the district’s old desegregation policy”)).
132. Id. (“‘I urge JCPS to immediately submit this to Judge Heyburn (U.S. 
District Judge John Heyburn II) for his review to avoid costly litigation.’” (quoting 
Teddy Gordon)).
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Ultimately, the Court, the schools, and the people must decide 
what they want from their schools, their government, and society. 
The Court should not continue to waffle on its analysis or its 
mandates. Brown II was clear about what was expected “with all 
deliberate speed.”133 The current courts want a Brown outcome but 
not at Brown costs.134 The Court wishes to achieve an effect without 
implementing the causes required. The Court will only be pushed if 
schools continue to bombard the docket with continual efforts.135 The 
Brown litigation was strategically mapped over decades.136 Schools 
will have to apply equally long-range planning in order to tactically 
position the Court.137 And communities must be willing to support 
their schools and the idea of improvement for all. The lack of 
community support leaves each and every school leader subject to 
overwhelming pressure and chastisement. It will take a village, not 
just to raise a child, but also to raise the achievement of all children.
IV. SCHUETTE
If PICS was the Court taking the legs out from Brown,
Schuette138 is the stake in Brown’s heart. Schuette revolved around 
Michigan’s battle over how, or whether, to consider race in state 
activities.139 For purposes of this Article, relevant state activities 
revolve around state-sponsored schooling. Each state has budgets 
and authorities governing how schooling should best exist at the 
elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels.140 While State A’s 
133. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
134. See generally PICS, 551 U.S. 701 (holding that, while serving important 
societal goals, race-conscious efforts to integrate the schools are unconstitutional).
135. See Ladson-Billings, supra note 21, at 4 (discussing the long-term 
strategy employed by the plaintiffs in Brown).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 3-5. The strategy cornering the Court that was used in Brown
worked there. There is no reason it would not work again.
138. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & 
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623 
(2014). 
139. In response to Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), the voters of the 
State of Michigan adopted an amendment to the State Constitution prohibiting the 
granting of preferences based on race in a wide range of actions and decisions, 
including university admissions. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629.
140. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 183 (charging the Kentucky General Assembly 
with “provid[ing] for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State”); 
MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 3 (creating the Michigan State Board of Education and 
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schooling might look slightly different than State B’s schooling (e.g., 
high school might include grades nine through twelve in State A, but 
only grades ten through twelve in State B), Brown ordered that as 
long as the state is involved in schooling, separate cannot be equal.141
While interpretations have differed, Brown’s order required 
desegregation and integration. This Article adopts Elizabeth 
Anderson’s argument surrounding The Imperative of Integration.142
Michigan universities used a variety of techniques in hopes of 
achieving Brown’s mandate. The Supreme Court previously 
reviewed these techniques, finding some legal and others not.143 In 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s analysis, Michigan voters took to 
the polls and amended their state constitution to order that (even) the 
acts the Supreme Court said are legal are no longer legal.144
Another helpful exercise for the reader might be comparing the 
activities in Schuette to the activities surrounding Brown, where in 
the middle of the twentieth century, many states were emphatic about 
maintaining segregated state activities (e.g., schooling, housing, 
transportation).145 Citizens within those states often violently 
protested community and legal efforts to integrate.146 Clearly, if those 
citizens had the option to pass an amendment to their state 
constitution forbidding integration and had the blessing of the 
Supreme Court to do so, today’s societal landscape would look 
incredibly different.
Readers might also note the legal framework that structured 
each case. In Brown, the “segregation was alleged to deprive the 
describing its powers); WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 2 (charging the Washington State 
Legislature with the provision of a “general and uniform system of public schools”).
141. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
142. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 12.
143. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that a state 
university law school had a compelling interest in promoting diversity in its student 
body, and that its admission policy favoring admission of underrepresented 
minorities was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny); Gratz, 539 
U.S. at 255, 275 (holding that, even if a state university had a compelling interest in 
diversity among its students, an undergraduate admissions policy that automatically 
awarded 20% of the required points for guaranteed admission based on race alone 
was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny and was therefore 
unconstitutional).
144. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629.
145. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 & n.13 (explaining that the order resulting 
from the case would follow supplemental briefing and argument due to the wide 
applicability and disparate effects of the Court’s decision).
146. See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing attitudes toward 
integration in Georgia following the Court’s decision in Brown).
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plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”147 Similarly, in Schuette, the issue was “whether an 
amendment to the Constitution of the State of Michigan, approved 
and enacted by its voters, is invalid under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.”148 The issues have not changed, but the perspectives 
have.149
The Court has gone from breathing life into the words “all men 
are created equal” to reviving “segregation now . . . segregation 
tomorrow . . . segregation forever.”150 Brown recognized the 
invidious origins of America and the reality those origins played in 
stymieing equality.151 Schuette chooses either to dismiss the origins 
recognized in Brown or, fantastically, conclude that sixty years have 
eradicated a 400-year history.152 Individual states are provided 
authority to reject the Brown mandate under a variety of de facto and 
implicit bias mechanisms.153 Under either reasoning, there is little 
that “Brown can do for you” today.154
147. Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
148. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629.
149. For a detailed discussion on the various perspectives surrounding a key 
issue in Schuette, the political-process doctrine, as well as additional analysis by 
Justice Sotomayor about race, see id. at 1651-83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
150. Governor George C. Wallace, The Inaugural Address of Governor 
George C. Wallace 2 (Jan. 14, 1963) (alteration in original), available at
http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/cdm/%20singleitem/collection/voices/id/2952/re
c/5. These infamous words from Governor Wallace have, unfortunately, proven true. 
In the South, there has been significant progress toward integration, but many of the 
gains in integration have been erased in recent years. In 1954, 0% of black students 
in the South attended majority white schools. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., BROWN AT 60:
GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 10 tbl.3 (2014), 
available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-
and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-
future/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf. Approximately thirty years after Brown, in 1986, 
42.9% of black students in the South attended majority white schools. Id. By 2011, 
this number had fallen to 23.2%. Id. During the 2011–2012 school year, nationwide, 
the average black student attended a school that was 72.4% minority, and the 
average Latino student attended a school that was 74.9% minority. Id. at 12 tbl.4.
151. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93 (“In approaching this problem, we cannot 
turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the 
light of its . . . present place in American life throughout the Nation.”).
152. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1654-56 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the historical context underlying the Schuette case).
153. See id. at 1638 (majority opinion).
154. This language is borrowed from an ad campaign from UPS. It involved 
a series of commercials with a person explaining one thing UPS can do for “you.” 
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V. EDUCATIONAL INTEGRATION STRATEGIES
The final Part of this Article will focus on strategies that Seattle 
and Louisville (and any other similarly situated school district) 
should implement to achieve success. The progressive thinkers have, 
for too long, taken a defensive approach.155 This can be seen by the 
off-balance measures used to counter the anti-affirmative action 
propositions launched by Ward Connerly and the Center for Equal 
Opportunity.156 Seattle and Louisville should be congratulated for 
reversing this trend. Assuming that Louisville and Seattle’s ultimate 
goal is voluntary integration, James Ryan’s analysis provides 
significant insight into how to proceed.157
A. Integration Analysis
Before discussing Professor Ryan’s ideas, this Article will 
further critique those assumed goals. The goal of voluntary 
integration should not be considered lightly. The school is a 
“microcosm of society.”158 If societal choices have led to segregated 
communities, should the schools be any different? Conceding the 
obvious, that the economic status of most historically marginalized 
communities, on average, places them in a situation where residential 
For example, one such commercial discusses the reliability UPS can offer. See
UPSWBCampaign, UPS Whiteboard–Reliability, YOUTUBE (Apr. 25, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6hLThc0RSrc&list=PL08B53A305DC8B228&i
ndex=9. Each video ends with the campaign slogan “What can Brown do for you?” 
See, e.g., id. at 0:26.
155. See John W. Whitehead & John M. Beckett, A Dysfunctional Supreme 
Court: Remedies and a Comparative Analysis, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 171, 180 
(2009) (discussing judicial minimalism as a strategic and defensive response to 
conservative justices striking down progressive legislation).
156. See Michael Arceneaux, Confused White People Call “My Brother’s 
Keeper” Racist, NEWSONE (Mar. 6, 2014), http://newsone.com/2946506/confused-
white-people-call-my-brothers-keeper-racist/ (criticizing statements by Roger Clegg 
of the Center for Equal Opportunity, while also claiming that there need to be “real 
efforts to tackle the policies that place the majority of minorities at an immediate 
disadvantage at birth”); Nathan Harden, Serious Questions for Ward Connerly,
NAT’L REV (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/phi-beta-
cons/288765/serious-questions-ward-connerly-nathan-harden (discussing allegations 
of financial impropriety made against Mr. Connerly).
157. Ryan, supra note 74, at 146-48.
158. See Ann Llewellyn, The Abuse of Children with Physical Disabilities in 
Mainstream Schooling, 37 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 740, 740
(1995) (“A school is merely a microcosm of society, a place in which one learns and 
experiments with how to relate to others.”).
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segregation is a given outcome,159 whether desired or not, would 
integration by any race be a choice if all factors were distributed 
evenly? One must consider factors of proximity to “good” 
employment and schools, crime rate, access to safe recreation, etc. If 
one assumes that all of these factors could be evenly achieved by 
each and every race, would the races voluntarily integrate? Or, 
would they segregate into clans (or communities) that were based 
upon shared backgrounds and beliefs?
To present yet another question: What if states “taxed” their 
population, then assigned an equal portion to each and every school? 
What if the federal government took on that role and assigned every 
school in the nation an equal portion? Would separate be equal? 
Would “achievements” be similar? The federal government has 
clearly indicated its intention to be a factor in education.160 This is 
evidenced by the latitude given to No Child Left Behind,161 Race to 
the Top,162 and the Supreme Court’s continual involvement on local 
plans to decrease educational segregation.163 If the federal 
government wants some level of control, perhaps it is time for the 
people to demand that control be either in full or completely ceded.
While the NAACP164 argued for and the Supreme Court found 
that separate can never be equal within the education setting,165
159. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 456 
tbl.697 (2012), available at
https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012edition.html. This table shows that 
black families had a median income of $38,409 in 2009, and Hispanic families had 
median income of $39,730, compared to $62,545 for white families. Id. This is a
nearly 40% difference between black and white.
160. See Ryan, supra note 74, at 150 (“Parents Involved . . . is hard to square 
with a commitment to local control, . . . federalism, and judicial restraint.”).
161. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002).
162. This refers to a grant program that was part of the stimulus bill passed 
in 2009. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115.
163. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 
(PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 710-11 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 
(2003).
164. A group that Du Bois challenges when he states, “The N.A.A.C.P. and 
other Negro organizations have spent thousands of dollars to prevent the 
establishment of segregated Negro schools, but scarcely a single cent to see that the 
division of funds between white and Negro schools, North and South, is carried out 
with some faint approximation of justice.” Du Bois, supra note 7, at 332.
165. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”).
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W.E.B. Du Bois raised the implications of just such a possibility in 
1935.166 He did so, because, according to Du Bois, 
Any agitation and action aimed at compelling a rich and powerful majority 
of the citizens to do what they will not do, is useless . . . [and] the futile 
attempt to compel even by law a group to do what it is determined not to 
do, is a silly waste of money, time, and temper.167
Though analyzed through a 1935 lens, this same contempt and 
futility exists today.168 With an eerie forecast to modern times, Du 
Bois wrote that if all of the public schools in the South were opened 
to all the races, “the education that colored children would get in 
them would be worse than pitiable.”169 Du Bois continued, “[t]he 
plain fact faces us, that either he will have separate schools or he will 
not be educated.”170
Du Bois, in stark contrast to many modern-day academicians, 
chose not to lay the fault upon the souls of white people.171
Assuredly, he would include their perspectives and actions in any 
equation analyzing the black plight.172 However, Du Bois chose to 
focus within. He chose to challenge the very race he desired to 
inspire. Instead of blaming “the others,” Du Bois says that
[a]s long as the Negro student wishes to graduate from Columbia, not 
because Columbia is an institution of learning, but because it is attended 
by white students; as long as a Negro student is ashamed to attend Fisk or 
Howard because these institutions are largely run by black folk, just so 
long the main problem of Negro education will not be segregation but self-
knowledge and self-respect.173
Thus, whether a school is integrated, evenly financed, or any 
combination in-between, the African-American students will not 
166. See generally Du Bois, supra note 7.
167. Id. at 329.
168. “The rest of the country appears to have turned its back on integration.” 
Ryan, supra note 74, at 155.
169. Du Bois, supra note 7, at 329.
170. Id.
171. See W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Souls of White Folk, 69 
INDEPENDENT 339, 342 (1910) (discussing the impact of science and religion on 
racial discourse).
172. See id. at 339. Du Bois posits that the subtext of every conversation 
between white and black is
“My poor un-white thing! Weep not nor rage. I know, too well, that the 
curse of God lies heavy on you. Why? That is not for me to say; but be 
brave! Do your work in your lowly sphere, praying the good Lord that into 
heaven above, where all is love, you may, one day, be born—white!”
Id.
173. Du Bois, supra note 7, at 331.
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achieve the same achievement outcomes as their European-American 
counterparts until the self-knowledge and self-respect of the African-
American race equals that of any other race.174 This is an argument 
for self-determination, instead of reliance. This is an argument that 
would be hard pressed to find disfavor among either progressives or 
conservatives.
The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education reports that, out of 
fifty-five Historically Black Colleges or Universities (HBCUs), only 
four graduate more than 50% of their students.175 Even worse, the 
number of African-American males who graduate is abysmal.176 This 
contrasts with the graduation rate for African-Americans in elite 
institutions. There, African-Americans graduate at a rate consistent 
with their European-American contemporaries—above 90%.177 Also 
of note are the disproportionate endowments “majority universities” 
receive over “minority universities.”178 If we consider the same 
analysis on the elementary and secondary education level, one would 
predict a similar outcome. Without similar resources, one must 
expect a highly correlated outcome. Less funding will likely lead to 
fewer graduates.179 Confounding variables surely exist; each one 
174. Id.
175. Tracking Graduation Rates at HBCUs, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 
5, 2012), http://www.jbhe.com/2012/01/tracking-graduation-rates-at-hbcus/.
176. Black Student College Graduation Rates Remain Low, but Modest 
Progress Begins to Show, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.jbhe.com/features/50_blackstudent_gradrates.html (showing that, 
overall, black men are graduating at a rate of 11% less than their female 
counterparts).
177. Id. (showing nine of the top schools in the United States with black 
graduation rates of at least 90%; also showing five prestigious schools with higher
black graduation rates than for whites).
178. Howard University, a private HBCU, has the largest HBCU endowment 
at $513.7 million. 2013 Top 10 HBCU Endowments, HBCU MONEY (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://hbcumoney.com/2014/02/03/2013-hbcu-endowments/. By comparison, 
Harvard University, a private university, has the largest endowment at $30 billion 
dollars. Devon Haynie, Universities with the Largest Financial Endowments, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 1, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/the-short-list-
college/articles/2013/10/01/universities-with-the-largest-financial-endowments-
colleges-with-the-largest-financial-endowments. Harvard’s endowment is almost 
sixty times greater than the largest HBCU. Even the tenth largest endowment of a 
non-HBCU, at University of Notre Dame, is more than twelve times that of the 
largest HBCU. See id.
179. Indeed, this has already proven true. A study from 2012 showed that the 
national graduation rate for black male students was 52% in the 2009–2010 school 
year, while the graduation rate for white males was 78%. SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB.
EDUC., THE URGENCY OF NOW: THE SCHOTT 50 STATE REPORT ON PUBLIC 
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should be addressed and eliminated rather than simply shuffled in 
hopes of finding the “magic” variable that will end all disparities.
B. Integration Strategies
Assuming that, after due deliberation, the Louisville and Seattle 
school districts determine that voluntary integration is their goal, 
Professor Ryan articulates aspects that the school districts must 
analyze.180 He starts with a question that simply evaluates whether 
his article is even necessary: “is this decision important and, if so, 
why?”181 He answers with a stoic “maybe” and supports his 
conclusions by assessing the confusion that the Supreme Court has 
brought to the voluntary-integration arena.182 Plans that would not 
only have been approved, but also encouraged in the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s are now being rejected, without hesitation.183 Professor 
Ryan points out one very important strategy though—“The Court left 
open whether [the Louisville and Seattle] plans might satisfy some 
different, not-yet-recognized compelling interest.”184 Professor Ryan 
highlights a portion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion that should guide 
Seattle, Louisville, and other similarly situated school districts:
“[School officials,] if necessary, [can conduct] a more nuanced, individual 
evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might include 
race as a component. The latter approach would be informed by Grutter,
though of course the criteria relevant to student placement would differ 
based on the age of the students, the needs of the parents, and the role of 
the schools.”185
This must be the strategy for Seattle, Louisville, and 
comparable school districts. The school districts in the Louisville and 
Seattle cases must view themselves in the same light as the parties in 
EDUCATION AND BLACK MALES 7 (2012), available at
http://blackboysreport.org/urgency-of-now.pdf.
180. Ryan, supra note 74, at 132; see also James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, 
and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 307-15 (1999) (suggesting two strategies for 
increasing integration; namely, using school finance cases to remedy the deprivation 
of adequate or equal education through racial and socioeconomic integration and 
working within the school-choice framework to benefit disadvantaged students).
181. Ryan, supra note 74, at 132.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 139-42.
184. Id. at 135.
185. Id. at 136 (alteration in original) (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 790 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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the Gratz case.186 Their controlling strategy should be to align 
themselves in a way that simulates the University of Michigan in the 
Grutter decision.187 Those who argue that elementary and secondary 
schooling differ from higher education are missing the point. Each of 
these situations involved an educational institution making 
choices.188 The plaintiffs complained because that choice used race as
a factor in coming to a decision, and the plaintiffs did not receive 
their first choice of schools.189 These factors replicate those found in 
the Grutter and Gratz decisions.190 Although the Court has supported 
the need to promote diversity at the higher education level, a 
majority of Justices suggested that the same support might be found 
for elementary and secondary education if the plans were tailored 
correctly.191
The mistake made in the Gratz case was the use of a numeric 
formula in weighting the applications from students of color.192 The 
Court had little patience for a strategy that involved no individual 
assessment of an applicant.193 The admissions office was unable to 
provide any significant level of analysis that showed that their 
specific process enhanced diversity on campus.194 In contrast, the 
admissions office in the Grutter case used “criteria [that] included 
the requirement that students be evaluated on an ‘individualized, 
holistic’ basis, which entailed consideration of all of the ways in 
which they might contribute to a diverse student body.”195
All school districts that choose to implement voluntary 
integration already have the research to support their goals.196 This 
was one of the major issues addressed in the Grutter decision.197 The 
school districts must keep recruiting additional benefactors who can 
186. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
187. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
188. PICS, 551 U.S. at 709-11.
189. Id.
190. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 252; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
191. See Ryan, supra note 74, at 135, 138; see also Kaufman, supra note 
130, at 11-12 (stating that a majority of the Court in PICS recognized a compelling 
governmental interest that justifies race-conscious integration strategies).
192. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
193. Id. at 271-72.
194. Id. at 270.
195. Ryan, supra note 74, at 136 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337).
196. See Linn & Welner, supra note 5, at 3 (“[T]he overall academic and 
social effects of increased racial diversity are likely to be positive.”); see also
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (recognizing “a compelling interest in obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body”).
197. See 539 U.S. at 343.
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contribute money, time, and legal analysis to the effort. These should 
include Fortune 500 companies, think tanks, universities, 501(c)(3) 
organizations, and a mosaic of individuals and entities representing
the American public. Each should be poised to inundate the Court 
with briefs in support of the evidence of economic, social, moral, and 
even spiritual reasons why voluntary-integration strategies are 
essential to the country.
The proponents of voluntary integration should also be ready to 
recite each and every opinion ever authored by Justice Kennedy, as 
he has been widely viewed as the crucial swing vote on the current 
Court, regarding the future of affirmative action and its close 
relative, integration.198 They should be familiar with not simply his 
Supreme Court opinions involving race, but also every opinion in 
every court on which he has sat. The opinions should be reviewed 
with precision regarding the manner in which Justice Kennedy 
follows his own precedent and guidance. He has surely commented 
in the past about how parties faltered in their attempts. Surely those 
same parties renewed their efforts and, potentially, reappeared before 
Justice Kennedy or one of his previous courts. His willingness to 
stand behind his comments in the past should provide judicial and 
public leverage for his continued consistency.199 Any failure to act in 
such a way will draw criticism and even ridicule upon a Court that 
has fashioned itself as a Court of little to no public sway, a Court that 
will stringently follow precedent.200
198. See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future 
Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1065 n.27 (2011) (discussing 
Equal Protection jurisprudence, including Justice Kennedy’s role as the “crucial vote 
in determining the scope of Fourteenth Amendment protection” in cases involving 
questions of race).
199. While this Article focuses on the Brown mandate and suggests Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis as one strategy for further implementation, other forms of 
Brown analysis, interpretation, and strategy should be simultaneously employed for 
the most effective and efficient implementation of Brown. See generally Kevin 
Brown, The Road Not Taken in Brown: Recognizing the Dual Harm of Segregation,
90 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2004) (discussing the reasoning that was available to the Court 
in Brown, but was not employed, which showed that segregation harms children of 
all races, ultimately concluding that this dual-harm argument would have been more 
effective in garnering support for integration).
200. See generally Areto A. Imoukhuede, Education Rights and the New Due 
Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467 (2014); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) (arguing that pluralism anxiety has led the Court to 
curtail equal protection rights and expand due process rights); Rex D. Glensy, The 
Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65 (2011) (arguing that human 
dignity is the most basic of values and should be recognized as such in American 
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CONCLUSION
This research was meant to address the measures attempted by 
different school districts to comport with the mandates of Brown.
These measures, whether taken with the best of intentions or not,
should always be studied regarding whether they are narrowing the 
“achievement gap.” Any failure to reach that outcome should result 
in critiquing the technique. Du Bois may have captured the point 
perfectly:
[T]heoretically, the Negro needs neither segregated schools nor mixed 
schools. What he needs is Education. What he must remember is that there 
is no magic, either in mixed schools or in segregated schools. A mixed 
school with poor and unsympathetic teachers, with hostile public opinion, 
and no teaching of truth concerning black folk, is bad. A segregated school 
with ignorant placeholders, inadequate equipment, poor salaries, and 
wretched housing, is equally bad. Other things being equal, the mixed 
school is the broader, more natural basis for the education of all youth. It 
gives wider contacts; it inspires greater self-confidence; and suppresses 
the inferiority complex. But other things seldom are equal, and in that 
case, Sympathy, Knowledge, and the Truth, outweigh all that the mixed 
school can offer.201
jurisprudence); James W. Paulsen, The Significance of Lawrence v. Texas, HOUS.
LAW., Jan./Feb. 2004, http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_jan04/page32.htm
(stating that the 2003 Term of the Court was “a confirmation of ‘the endless capacity 
of the Court to astonish and surprise’” (quoting Robert C. Post, Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (2003))).
201. Du Bois, supra note 7, at 335.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
